Measure V promises that the new sales-tax revenue will be subject to an independent annual audit. What does the ordinance's Annual Audit section actually require?
Measure V's ordinance section 7.34.140, “Annual Audit,” says:
“The proceeds resulting from this transactions and use tax shall be deposited into the City's General Fund and become subject to the same independent annual audit requirements as other general fund revenue.”
That is the audit promise.
It does not create a special performance audit tied to the services used to promote Measure V. It does not require the Auditor to determine whether a fire station stayed open, whether nine Fire positions remained filled, whether 911 response improved, or whether any other advertised service outcome occurred.
The audit is real. The service promises are simply not what it audits.
Measure U was developed around a public list of proposed infrastructure projects. What does the legal measure say about that list?
The full text says bond funding “should be guided” by the City's non-exhaustive list of proposed projects. It then expressly says projects not identified in that process are also eligible if they fit the measure's broad real-property infrastructure purposes.
The Council resolution placing Measure U on the ballot is even clearer. Its CEQA finding says the financing mechanism:
“does not involve any commitment to specific projects to be constructed with proceeds of the Bonds.”
So the recognizable project list voters see is not the delivery baseline the Auditor will later enforce.
Measure U requires an audit by the City Auditor at least once every three years. What test does the measure specify?
Section 6.G says:
“All expenditures will be subject to an audit by the City Auditor at least once every three years to confirm that Bond expenditures are consistent with the intent of this Measure.”
That is broader than merely checking whether a check cleared. The Auditor can test whether an expenditure fits Measure U's legal purposes.
But the measure supplies no fixed voter-approved project list, required quantities, completion dates, facility-condition targets, service outcomes, or cost-effectiveness standards.
A perfectly clean Measure U audit could therefore coexist with:
- projects voters saw being removed or substituted;
- dramatically changed project scopes;
- planning completed without construction;
- spending concentrated on a different eligible priority; or
- far less physical infrastructure delivered than voters expected.
Suppose Berkeley lawfully used the entire $300 million Measure U authorization for one eligible City employee facility: an extravagant cafeteria, a pole-dancing studio presented as employee recreation, and a 100-foot statue of the Mayor integrated as civic art. What would Measure U's required audit ask?
The example is absurd on purpose.
Assume the City and bond counsel have lawfully structured the project as an eligible municipal facility improvement and satisfied every other legal requirement. Measure U's audit still asks whether the expenditure is consistent with the measure's intent.
It does not ask:
- Was this a sane priority?
- Was it worth $300 million?
- Did voters want it?
- Was there a higher-value eligible project?
- Did Berkeley deliver the recognizable package used to sell the bond?
Berkeley's T1 program already establishes the ordinary part of the hypothetical: bond money can improve employee-facing municipal spaces. The absurdity is the degree and priority, because those are precisely the things Measure U does not ask the Auditor to judge.
Suppose a Measure U project is presented as a physical improvement, but Council later narrows the funded scope to planning and design. The drawings are completed and no construction ever starts. What in Measure U requires the Auditor to call that a failed bond promise?
Measure U expressly includes planning and program-management costs among eligible project costs. It also says Council cannot guarantee that bond proceeds will be sufficient to complete all needed improvements.
The audit provision adds no requirement that a bond-funded design effort culminate in construction.
Berkeley's T1 history shows how this can work in practice. Staff has explicitly reduced scopes from construction to planning and design, and later project lists have reported conceptual design complete while construction remained unfunded.
That can be a rational response when money runs short. But it exposes the audit distinction:
The drawings can be finished. The funded scope can be called complete. The audit can be clean. Nothing physical has to exist.
Berkeley also passed a 2020 Emergency Response Measure FF for fire, emergency medical response, 911, and wildfire preparedness. What were the City Auditor's two stated objectives when it audited that measure in 2023?
This is not the 2024 SAFE STREETS Measure FF discussed in the next questions. Berkeley reused the letter FF in different elections.
The 2020 Measure FF funded fire services, emergency response, 911 communications, hazard mitigation, and wildfire prevention.
The Auditor's 2023 objectives were:
- Did Measure FF spending align with the ballot measure and City code?
- Were adequate internal processes in place to ensure that the funds were used as intended?
The audit traced expenditures, reviewed controls, and identified weaknesses. It was legitimate and useful.
It did not test whether voters received a defined improvement in emergency response, wildfire loss, or another voter-approved service outcome. The Auditor even flagged that one program lacked performance measures.
Berkeley voters later passed a completely different 2024 SAFE STREETS Measure FF. What makes its audit requirement materially stronger than Measure U's?
The 2024 SAFE STREETS Measure FF is the key counterexample because Berkeley voters adopted actual outcome accountability.
The measure sets goals to be achieved by December 31, 2036, including:
- raising Berkeley's Pavement Condition Index to 70 or above, ideally with no streets below 50;
- eliminating the backlog of damaged sidewalks and pedestrian paths; and
- significantly reducing or eliminating fatal and severe traffic crashes.
Then it requires an independent performance audit to verify progress toward those goals.
The annual reporting requirements supply concrete measurements: miles paved, cost per mile, citywide PCI, PCI by street, sidewalk progress, safety projects, and fatal and severe injuries.
Compare the instructions:
Measure U: Is spending consistent with the measure's intent?
2024 SAFE STREETS: Are we making measurable progress toward these stated outcomes by this date?
The 2024 SAFE STREETS Measure FF goes one step further. Which requirement has a defined financial consequence if Berkeley violates it?
This is the difference between measurement and enforcement.
SAFE STREETS requires Berkeley to maintain a specified level of street funding from sources other than the new tax. If Council fails that test, the measure says Council is not authorized to impose the special tax for the following two years, subject to specified exceptions.
That produces four distinct levels of accountability:
1. Money accounted for — Measure V's ordinary General Fund audit. 2. Spending legally compliant — Measure U's consistency-with-intent audit and the 2020 Emergency Response Measure FF audit. 3. Promised result measurable — 2024 SAFE STREETS goals and performance audit. 4. Defined consequence for failure — SAFE STREETS' maintenance-of-effort rule.
Those are radically different things, even though all can be advertised with the comforting phrase “independent audit.”
Quiz complete
“Independent audit” does not tell you what voters are being protected against.
Measure V gets the ordinary annual audit applied to General Fund revenue. Measure U asks the Auditor to determine whether bond expenditures are consistent with the measure's broad intent. Neither gives the Auditor a binding set of voter-approved service or delivery outcomes to enforce.
Berkeley knows how to write a stronger measure. The 2024 SAFE STREETS Measure FF gives the Auditor goals, metrics, and a deadline, and explicitly requires verification of progress. It even contains one funding requirement with a defined financial consequence for failure.