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Berkeley Decision Project

Did Berkeley’s City Council vibe its way to a $300 million bond?

A step-by-step reconstruction of the decisions that produced Measure U, from the first staff recommendation to the ballot. Each step is taken from the City’s own record.

Measure U · decision process · October 2026

What happened

  1. The starting point
    Observed
    Infrastructure of more than $1.5 billion

    Why the quotes? The $1.5 billion figure combines different kinds of projects under one ‘need’ label—including repair and replacement needs, desired improvements, and unfinished work. Being in an infrastructure backlog does not by itself establish that a project is necessary, high-value, or appropriate for long-term debt.

    The City estimates its long-term infrastructure needs exceed $1.5 billion. Any bond will cover a fraction of that, which makes choosing what to fund the central decision.

    The proposed FY 2027–2031 Capital Improvement Program, presented to the Council’s Budget and Finance Policy Committee on May 28, 2026, put the City’s current estimate of unfunded capital and maintenance needs at $2.12 billion, against $407 million in funding planned over its five years. Streets and roads are $263 million of that need; the City’s 2024 pavement survey put the network’s Pavement Condition Index at 56 out of 100 (the CIP gives 57). The same line was $1.21 billion in the March 2021 unfunded-needs report, whose $1.1 billion headline is what remained after five years of planned spending. The 2021 table had seven asset categories and the 2026 table has sixteen; the nine added, from undergrounding to the Veterans Building and Old City Hall, account for $693 million of the 2026 total.

    March 17, 2026 staff report, p. 3; proposed FY 2027–2031 CIP Overview, May 28, 2026, pp. 82, 84–87; 2024 Pavement Management Program Update, p. 5; March 16, 2021 unfunded-needs report, pp. 2, 41
  2. December 2, 2025
    Observed
    Staff propose a GO bond of “up to $300 million”

    The first recommendation asks Council to “gauge voter interest for a General Obligation (GO) bond on the November 2026 ballot that could generate up to $300 million.” No survey had been run and no project list existed.

    The figure came with a tax-rate case: combined with existing bonds, an average rate of $44 per $100,000 of assessed value, “less than the historical average tax rate.”

    December 2, 2025 work session, Special Item 2 staff report, pp. 2, 5
  3. December 2, 2025
    On the record

    “This does tell us that we’ve probably under-leveraged our bond capacity over time, so there’s more room.”

    Councilmember Brent Blackaby, December 2, 2025 work session, 00:41:48 (City captions, p. 27)
  4. February 19–23, 2026
    Observed
    Survey tests $200 million against $300 million

    Lake Research Partners polled 500 likely voters. Half heard a $300 million bond, half a $200 million bond.

    71%yes on $300M
    70%yes on $200M
    72% / 63%$300M / $200M after pro and con arguments
    March 17, 2026 staff report, pp. 2, 19 (survey presentation)
  5. March 17, 2026 · the pollster’s reading
    Our interpretation, in the pollster’s words
    GO BIG

    “Support is statistically the same between the two versions, indicating that there is no reason to not put the higher $300m amount on the ballot.”

    Lake Research Partners, survey presentation in the March 17, 2026 Council packet, p. 19

    No penalty for the larger number was read as the reason to ask for it.

  6. March 17, 2026 · 00:47:45
    On the record

    “Given that the support didn’t really change, or even arguably went up when we went from 200 to 300 million, I was wondering if a higher number was considered, or will be considered. … How far can we take this?”

    Councilmember Shoshana O’Keefe, March 17, 2026 special meeting, 00:47:45 (City captions, p. 35)
  7. March 17, 2026 · 00:49
    On the record

    “$300 million was… It felt like a lot.”

    “$22 per $100,000 of assessed value, that seems kind of a reasonable amount.”

    “…it’s not like a science.”

    City staff, asked how the $300 million was chosen, March 17, 2026 (City captions, p. 36)
  8. March 17 → June 16, 2026
    Observed
    $300 MILLION

    Council unanimously directs ballot language “for a potential $300 million General Obligation bond measure,” and on June 16 places it on the ballot. Measure U’s text: “The estimated cost of the Improvements to be funded by the Bonds is $300,000,000.”

    March 17, 2026 staff report, p. 1; annotated agenda, March 17, 2026; Measure U full text, §3

Three questions, and what the answers would have shown

  1. Which items are actually needs — and which outcomes have the highest public value?

    The recordThe City’s Parks, Recreation and Waterfront Commission told Council the project list’s staff report shows “no scoring, no weighting, no documented analysis,” and that the director confirmed “there was no formal scoring system.” Staff’s March 17 presentation scored candidate projects “within a $100M per-category cap ($300M total).”

    The insightA $1.5 billion backlog mixes repairs that cannot wait with improvements people want and old promises not yet kept. Listing it is not prioritizing it. And with no ranking, $300 million was a container the projects were fitted into, never an amount derived from the outcomes worth buying.

    Parks, Recreation and Waterfront Commission report, April 14, 2026, p. 5; March 17, 2026 staff report, p. 81

  2. What evidence showed that Berkeley could successfully deliver a $300 million capital program?

    The recordThe City Auditor found that Berkeley paved zero streets in 2018 because construction bids went out too late, despite $8.6 million set aside for repairs. Public Works has had three directors since 2020: Liam Garland (2020, resigned November 2023), then an interim period, Terrance Davis (effective April 15, 2024) and Jamie Parks (effective August 17, 2026). And on May 19, asked by Councilmember Blackaby “How would you staff it and organize it?”, the City Manager said “…we haven’t come up with exactly what the staffing model would look like, but we’ve built in the additional costs to add staff to run the measure.”

    The insightBefore authorizing a capital program three times the size of T1, Council had reason to test the City’s execution capacity. The record instead showed management turnover, a documented delivery failure, and a staffing model still being worked out.

    City Auditor, Rocky Road, November 2020; City Manager’s Public Works leadership announcement, November 9, 2023; Council Item 13, March 26, 2024; Council Item 7, July 14, 2026; City captions, May 19, 2026, pp. 62–63, 01:30:27–01:31:45

  3. If the bond moves employees off the General Fund, what happens to the work they’re doing now?

    The recordOn March 17 the City Manager said part of the deficit challenge “includes shifting a lot of people off of general fund and into special funds,” and that with more special-fund dollars from the bond “we would be able to, you know, offset some of those staff challenges.” The next words on the record: “Great, thank you, that’s really helpful.” The budget presented May 19 had Public Works “shifting the costs of 51 additional positions to other eligible funds.” The budget does not say these positions would be charged to Measure U; it shows the department’s strategy of moving payroll off the General Fund, the context in which the bond was sized.

    The insightIf those employees keep doing the work they do now, the bond is spending capital dollars to avoid General Fund cuts the deficit requires.

    City captions, March 17, 2026, p. 32, 00:44:28; Proposed FY 2027 & FY 2028 Biennial Budget, May 19, 2026, Item 21, pp. 41–42

The process discovered how much voters might tolerate before establishing what Berkeley should buy and can deliver.

Start with what is worth delivering. Commit to it. Price it. Then decide how much to borrow.

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